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Abstract 
More powerful computers and affordable digital video equipment means that desktop 
video editing is now accessible and popular. In two experiments, we investigated whether 
seeing fake video evidence, or simply being told that video evidence exists, could lead 
people to believe they committed an act they never did. Subjects completed a 
computerized gambling task, and when they returned later the same day, we falsely 
accused them of cheating on the task. All of the subjects were told that incriminating 
video evidence existed, and half were also exposed to a fake video. See-video subjects 
were more likely to confess without resistance, and to internalize the act than told-video 
subjects, and see-video subjects tended to confabulate details more often than told-video 
subjects. We offer a metacognitive-based account of our results. 
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INNOCENT BUT PROVEN GUILTY: ELICITING INTERNALIZED FALSE 
CONFESSIONS USING DOCTORED VIDEO EVIDENCE 
For a 1994 audience, seeing Forrest Gump shake hands with President J.F.K was 
astonishing. Forrest Gump, the movie, was released 31 years after J.F.K’s assassination so 
this clip appeared to rewrite history. Today, Hollywood producers still recreate the past; 
so too do amateur video-editing enthusiasts. With the advent of more powerful computers 
and increasingly affordable digital equipment, desktop video editing has become simple to 
perform and popular. This raises an important question: Could fake video evidence lead 
people to believe they committed an act they never did?  
A number of recent studies have demonstrated that various forms of fake evidence can 
lead people to confess to things they did not do (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, & Josephs, 
2003; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004; Redlich & Goodman, 2003). Kassin and Kiechel 
(1996), for instance, asked people to complete a computer-based reaction time task. 
Subjects were warned not to press the ALT key because doing so would cause the 
computer to crash. Of course, the computer was configured to crash regardless, and the 
experimenters consequently accused subjects of pressing the key. Half of the subjects 
were also confronted with false eyewitness testimony, and when this testimony followed a 
fast-paced reaction time task, all these subjects falsely confessed to hitting ALT. 
Moreover, 65% told another confederate that they had mistakenly pressed the key, which 
was argued to indicate that they believed (internalized) the false act had occurred. Kassin 
and Kiechel’s results showed that bogus testimony is powerful; it can lead people to 
confess to a self-involving act that they never committed.  
What might happen though, if we used fake video evidence rather than fake eyewitness 
testimony? Would subjects find the fake video compelling? Moreover, would subjects be 
more likely to internalize the false act if they were shown the false video than if they were 
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merely told of the video’s existence? This comparison between seeing incriminating 
evidence and being told that incriminating evidence exists is important because in the 
USA, interrogators can legally tell suspects that incriminating evidence exists, and they 
can fabricate evidence—such as fingerprints or hair samples—in order to elicit a 
confession (Gudjonsson, 2003; Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2001; Leo, 1992; Young, 
1996).  
In the experiments we present here, we filmed subjects as they carried out a 
computerized gambling task that required them to take fake money from the “bank” when 
they answered questions correctly, and to return fake money to the bank when they 
answered questions incorrectly. Later, subjects returned to the lab and the experimenter 
accused them of taking money when they should have returned it. Half of the subjects 
were told that incriminating video evidence existed (hereafter, the told-video group), and 
half were exposed to a doctored video that depicted them committing the act (hereafter, 
the see-video group). An important point to note about our procedure is that unlike Kassin 
and Kiechel’s (1996) computer-crash method in which subjects always witness the target 
false event occurring (i.e., they see the computer crash), our subjects did not witness the 
false event. Indeed, the only purported evidence against them was the false video 
evidence. 
How, then, might false video evidence influence the likelihood of internalized false 
confessions? One theoretical account that can guide our thinking is Mazzoni et al.’s 
metacognitive model (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001). 
According to the model, to develop false beliefs subjects must first become confident that 
a false event happened to them. This process begins when subjects are confronted with a 
counterfactual suggestion. At first, subjects might say that the event did not occur because 
they have knowledge that refutes the suggestion, they have no memory of the event, or 
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they do not have enough information to make a judgement. However, feeding subjects 
false information can transform their beliefs; it can cause them to think their memory is 
unreliable and it encourages them to turn to external sources to infer whether an event 
genuinely happened.  
Based on the metacognitive model, we predicted that telling subjects that incriminating 
video evidence exists would challenge their beliefs about the reliability of their memory 
and lead some of them to confess. Showing subjects a doctored video, however, should 
both challenge their beliefs about the accuracy of their memory and provide an external 
source that they could use to infer the act occurred. We also know that seeing is believing: 
in both legal and everyday decision-making tasks people are more persuaded by visual 
than by verbal evidence (Kassin & Dunn, 1997; King, Dent, & Miles, 1991). Thus see-
video subjects should be more likely to confess to the act and come to believe that the act 
really happened than told-video subjects.  
There are, however, reasons to expect that viewing the doctored video would not 
increase the likelihood of false beliefs. In the metacognitive model, people will readily 
reject a suggested event if they judge that their absence of a memory is diagnostic, that is, 
if they decide that having no memory confirms that the event never happened (Mazzoni & 
Kirsch, 2002; see also Dodson and Schacter, 2001). In addition, research shows that 
memories of recent events—such as experiences that occurred within the last year—are 
packed with perceptual, contextual and semantic details (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & 
Raye, 1988; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). We might predict, then, that subjects 
would be skeptical if they were told they committed a mischievous act, but at the same 
time had no vivid memory of this event occurring. This skepticism might act as a warning; 
prompting subjects to systematically evaluate their memories and the reliability of the 
video evidence. Research shows that people can and do evaluate the source of a 
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suggestion before accepting it as fact (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Vornik, Sharman, & 
Garry, 2003), and people are well informed about the advances of digital software. Indeed, 
we asked 66 volunteers to list as many photo- and video-editing software products as they 
could—75% named at least one program and 50% reported having edited digital media at 
some point in the past. Finally, research by Garry and Wade (2005) revealed that verbal 
descriptions of a false event were more likely to elicit illusory beliefs than doctored 
photographs. Thus, subjects might not find our doctored video evidence compelling. 
In sum, our goals were threefold: to test whether viewing doctored video evidence 
would elicit more false confessions and false beliefs than merely being told that video 
evidence exists, to develop a new paradigm for examining the effect of fabricated 
evidence on false confessions, and to gather information about possible cognitive 
influences.  
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Subjects 
Thirty students (13 males, 17 females; M = 21.20 years, SD = 2.48, Range = 18-27) at 
Warwick University received £6 for participating. We randomly allocated them to the see-
video or told-video condition and they took part individually.  
Procedure 
The University of Warwick Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee approved our procedure. Two experimenters and one confederate conducted 
the experimental sessions.1 To ensure that the experimenters and confederate behaved 
consistently and similarly across subjects, they were extensively trained to follow an 
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interview protocol. Subjects always met with the same experimenter at Session 1 and 
Session 2. 
Session 1  
In Session 1, subjects completed a computerized gambling task. They were told that the 
experimenters were investigating the effects of gambling with physical and electronic 
credit. All subjects were told that they were in the “physical credit” condition and that 
they would be filmed completing the gambling task in two separate sessions. Subjects 
were seated in front of a computer, and given a pile of fake money to gamble with and a 
pile that represented the bank. They were told that their gambling money was the previous 
subject’s winnings, and the aim of the task was “to increase those winnings by as much as 
possible for the next subject.” In reality, subjects always began with the same amount of 
money (£115). Next, the experimenter gave the subject an opportunity to ask questions, 
started the video-camera recording in full view of the subject, and left the room. When the 
subject finished, the experimenter re-entered the room and reminded the subject to return 
for Session 2 (approximately 2-3 hours later) to complete a second gambling task.  
The gambling task. We created a general knowledge, multiple-choice, computerized 
gambling task. There were 15 questions, and each question had four possible responses. 
Each response was associated with a different odds ratio (Figure 1). Subjects selected an 
answer and typed in the amount of money they wished to gamble on each question. We 
piloted the task, and adjusted the difficulty of the questions until pilot subjects performed 
at 33% accuracy. Subjects received feedback after responding to each question. If their 
response was correct, a green tick appeared with instructions to take money from the bank. 
If their response was incorrect, a red cross appeared with instructions to return money to 
the bank. The task took approximately 15 minutes to complete.  
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Creating the video. In between the two sessions, we used an iMac and Final Cut Pro 5® 
to create the doctored video. We took a 10- to 20-second segment that showed the subject 
answering a question correctly and digitally replaced the green tick on the monitor with a 
red cross (Figure 2). The resulting clip ostensibly showed the subject collecting money 
from the bank when they should have returned money.  
Session 2 
In Session 2, the experimenter informed the subject that there was a problem with the 
earlier session: the video showed that the subject took money from the bank instead of 
returning it when they answered a question incorrectly. The experimenter told the subject 
that the incident meant her or his data were invalid, as were the data from the next subject 
who inherited the wrong sum of money. See-video subjects also viewed a doctored video-
clip that depicted them committing this act. They were allowed to watch the clip through 
twice if they requested. 
Next, subjects were asked to sign a confession form (Appendix), that had been 
handwritten by the experimenter prior to the session, to confirm that they took money 
from the bank when they should have returned it. They were told that if they signed the 
confession they would not receive their £6 payment, and if they did not sign the 
confession they would have to meet with the professor in charge of the study to find out 
whether or not they would receive payment. If the subject refused to sign the confession, 
the experimenter said that the professor was likely to refuse payment because the video 
clearly showed that the subject took the money. The experimenter then asked the subject 
once more to sign the statement. These two requests to sign the confession served as our 
measure of compliance. 
Subjects who did not sign were asked to write down what they thought the study was 
investigating2. This enabled us to determine whether subjects figured out the true nature of 
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the experiment. Subjects who signed the confession were also asked to write down what 
they thought the study was investigating and they were asked to sit in a waiting room 
while the experimenter spoke with the professor in charge. A confederate —blind to the 
experimental hypotheses—was posing as another subject in the waiting room. She 
initiated a conversation according to the protocol and encouraged the subject to describe 
the accusation by enquiring which study she or he was participating in and why they were 
waiting. Unless the subject clearly stated that they did not believe they had committed the 
act, the confederate asked whether she or he could remember how the error occurred. This 
conversation was covertly recorded using a digital voice recorder and served as our 
measure of internalization and confabulation. The confederate was always blind to the 
condition to which subjects were assigned, but on some occasions this blind was broken 
because the subject mentioned being told about or viewing the video evidence. We return 
to this issue shortly. 
Finally, subjects returned to the laboratory and the experimenter asked if she or he 
could describe how the error occurred. If the subject speculated about a possible scenario 
or confabulated details, the experimenter asked the subject to write the details down on the 
back of the confession statement. These details served as an additional measure of 
confabulation. Subjects were debriefed and asked to provide retrospective consent for 
having their conversation with the confederate recorded. All subjects gave consent.  
Scoring compliance, internalization, and confabulation 
Recall that the confederate did not always remain blind to each subject’s condition. To 
ensure that the confederate did not lead the subject when the blind was broken, we 
screened transcripts of subjects’ discussions with the confederate. The confederate never 
deviated from the interview protocol, thus we are confident that see-video and told-video 
subjects were treated equally.  
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Subjects were judged as having complied if they signed the confession statement on the 
first or second request. Two trained observers reviewed transcripts of the subjects’ 
discussions with the confederate and used Redlich and Goodman’s (2003) trichotomous 
coding scheme to determine whether each subject internalized the act and confabulated. 
To ensure that the observers were blind to the see-video/told-video manipulation, we 
removed any comments from the transcripts that revealed which condition the subject was 
in. The observers categorized subjects as no internalization, partial internalization or full 
internalization. To be categorized as partial internalization subjects had to make 
statements indicating that they believed they might have committed the act (“I think I 
messed up his experiment”), and to be categorized as full internalization they had to make 
statements indicating that they believed they did commit the act (“I took money when I 
was supposed to give it back”). The observers categorized subjects as no confabulation, 
hypothesizing or full confabulation.  To be categorized as hypothesizing subjects were 
required to speculate about what could have happened, without implying that was how it 
did happen (“I probably expected I was right, and didn’t take any notice of the cross”), 
and to be categorized as full confabulation subjects were required to describe how the act 
occurred (“I was concentrating so hard on the money, I forgot to give rather than take 
when I was wrong”). Observers agreed on 83% (κ = .67) of internalization categorizations 
and 83% (κ = .47) of confabulation categorizations. When observers disagreed, the more 
conservative categorization was accepted. The video recordings showed that none of the 
subjects took money from the bank when they were not supposed to. 
Results and Discussion 
Most subjects seemed to be extremely surprised when the experimenter revealed the 
true nature of the study. For example, one subject replied “You’re kidding? I really 
thought I did that!” Moreover, subjects’ notes about the purpose of the experiment showed 
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that all of them believed the study aimed to investigate gambling behavior and not false 
confessions or any topic related to memory distortions, compliance and so on. Together 
these findings suggest that our results are not the product of experimental demand.  
Rates of compliance, internalization, and confabulation 
All subjects signed the confession form (complied) either on the first or second request. 
This finding replicates the extraordinarily high compliance rates found in previous false 
evidence studies (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Redlich & Goodman, 2003). Eighty-seven 
percent of subjects signed on the first request and 13% on the second request. Moreover, 
the observers’ classifications revealed that 20% partially internalized the act and 63% 
fully internalized the act. Seven percent of subjects hypothesized about why they took the 
money and 3% fully confabulated details about how it occurred. Taken together, these 
data provide further evidence that a combination of social demand, phoney evidence and 
false suggestion from a credible source can lead a substantial number of people to falsely 
confess and believe they committed an act they never did. 
Recall that our primary question was whether see-video subjects were more likely than 
told-video subjects to confess to and believe they committed the act. To address this 
question we calculated the percentage of told-video and see-video subjects classified as 
complying, internalizing and confabulating and conducted three 2 x 3 Fisher’s exact tests. 
These data and the corresponding p-values are presented in Table 1. As these results show, 
see-video and told-video subjects were equally likely to confess, but there was a tendency 
for see-video subjects to confess on the first request more often than told-video subjects 
(row 1 in Table 1). In terms of internalization, there were significant group differences 
(row 2 in Table 1). Taking a closer look at the internalization data, using 2x2 Fisher’s 
exact tests, we found that see-video subjects were no more likely to fully internalize the 
accusation than told-video subjects, p = 1.00. However, when we collapsed across the 
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partial and full internalization categories we found that see-video subjects were more 
likely to partially or fully internalize the act than told-video subjects, p = .04. Finally, in 
terms of hypothesizing and confabulating (row 3 in Table 1), the two groups did not differ 
significantly. 
These results lead us to conclude that the doctored-video paradigm is a powerful tool 
for eliciting and examining false confessions. Perhaps more importantly, our findings 
suggest that viewing fabricated evidence might promote internalization more than being 
falsely told that evidence exists. Our findings fit with the metacognitive account of false 
beliefs (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002) and warrant concern about the use of fabricated 
evidence in interrogations (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The false act used in Experiment 1 was designed to be more memorable than the false 
acts used in most confession studies, and more ecologically valid in that it involves some 
amount of intention, a negative consequence, and could be perceived as having a motive 
(but see Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005). It is possible, however, that our 
confession rates were high in Experiment 1 because the cheating event was still somewhat 
plausible. Indeed, subjects answered, on average, 10 out of 15 questions incorrectly on the 
gambling task, thus many subjects may have been unsure whether they were innocent or 
guilty when the experimenter accused them of taking money from the bank. To ensure that 
our findings were not the result of using a highly plausible “crime”, in Experiment 2 we 
attempted to replicate our findings, but we accused subjects of something much less 
plausible: inappropriately taking money from the bank on three occasions. To confirm that 
taking money on three occasions would be a less plausible accusation, we described the 
experiment to 20 volunteers. We asked them how plausible it would be on a scale from 1 
(very implausible) to 7 (very plausible), for them to have improperly taken money on 
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either one or three occasions, without remembering doing so. The volunteers determined 
that making three mistakes was significantly less plausible (M = 1.75) than making one 
mistake, (M = 3.30), t(19) = 5.82, p < .0001; also 80% rated three mistakes as less 
plausible than one mistake and 50% rated three mistakes as ‘very implausible.’ As in 
Experiment 1, subjects in Experiment 2 always sat directly in front of the screen, and the 
on-screen feedback was clear and large; they also knew they had made these mistakes on 
only a small subset of questions. Thus subjects could not feasibly conclude that three 
mistakes were equally as plausible as one mistake by reasoning that the feedback was 
ambiguous or that they could have misunderstood the instructions.  
Method 
Subjects 
Thirty students (13 males, 17 females; M = 20.43 years, SD = 1.94, Range = 18-24) at 
Warwick University received £6 for participating. We randomly allocated them to the see-
video or told-video condition. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except for three modifications. First, in 
Session 2, instead of accusing subjects of taking money from the bank when they 
answered one question incorrectly, the experimenter accused subjects of taking money 
from the bank on three separate occasions, when they answered three questions 
incorrectly. Second, we doctored three sections of see-video subjects’ original recordings 
so that the fake videos depicted them improperly taking money from the bank three times. 
To do this we needed to ensure that subjects answered at least three questions correctly. 
Thus we increased the length of the quiz from 15 to 18 questions, gave subjects more 
money to gamble with (£265) and made the questions slightly easier.  
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Two independent observers, blind to which condition each subject was in, categorized 
subjects’ discussions with the confederate. The observers agreed on 80% (κ = .68) of the 
internalization categorizations and on 93% (κ = .80) of confabulation categorizations. 
Once again, the more conservative of the observers’ categorizations were accepted, and 
none of the subjects took money from the bank when they were not supposed to. 
Results and Discussion 
Even with a less plausible accusation, the vast majority of subjects signed the 
confession and internalized the false act.3 Overall, 93% of subjects complied; 87% on the 
first request and 7% on the second request. Thirty percent of subjects partially internalized 
the act and 43% fully internalized it.  Ten percent of subjects hypothesized about how it 
might have happened and 7% confabulated details. Except for the full internalization rate 
of told-video subjects, which was notably lower than in the previous experiment, these 
confession and internalization rates are similar to those in Experiment 1. Thus, even when 
subjects were accused of committing a relatively implausible act, we obtained extremely 
high levels of false confessions and false beliefs.  
Table 2 shows the percentage of told-video and see-video subjects classified as 
complying, internalizing and confabulating, and the corresponding 2 x 3 Fisher’s exact 
test p-values. As in Experiment 1, see-video subjects and told-video subjects were equally 
likely to confess (row 1 in Table 2). In terms of internalization, again there were 
significant group differences (row 2 in Table 2). See-video subjects were more likely to 
fully internalize guilt than told-video subjects, p = .003. However, when we collapsed 
across the partial and full internalization categories, we found no significant differences, p 
= .22. As for the confabulation measure, in Experiment 1 we found no group differences, 
but in Experiment 2 see-video subjects were more likely to hypothesize or confabulate 
than told-video subjects, p = .04.  
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Together, these data replicate those in Experiment 1 by showing that viewing the video 
led to higher internalization rates than being told that the video existed. The finding that 
see-video subjects were more likely to hypothesize or confabulate than told-video subjects 
fits with Kassin and Kiechel’s (1996) seminal computer-crash experiment which showed 
subjects were more likely to fabricate information if eyewitness evidence existed than if it 
did not.  
The findings in Experiment 2 rule out a possible counterexplanation for the high 
confession rates observed in Experiment 1; that is, that subjects signed the confession 
statement because they thought the target false event was likely to have occurred. Even 
when subjects were accused of cheating three times—an act that independent observers 
rated as relatively implausible—subjects still confessed at extremely high rates. Thus, the 
idea that our findings were attributable to the plausibility of the accusation cannot account 
for our results.  
Finally, the conversations subjects had with our confederate illustrate the conviction 
with which subjects held their false beliefs. Table 3 provides some sample conversations 
which demonstrate that subjects did not merely comply with the suggestion; rather, they 
expressed deep concern at having taken the money and at having compromised the data. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
Ours is the first study to demonstrate the dangers of modern digital manipulation 
technology when encouraging people to remember self-involving, recently occurring 
experiences (see also Garry & Wade, 2005; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002); and on 
a broader level our results show that seeing fake evidence is more convincing than being 
merely told of its existence. When our subjects viewed fake video evidence, nearly 100% 
falsely confessed, and 67% (Experiment 1) and 73% (Experiment 2) believed they 
committed a false act. When subjects were simply told that video evidence existed, again, 
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nearly 100% falsely confessed, and 60% (Experiment 1) and 13% (Experiment 2) 
developed false beliefs. The fact that our internalization ratings were derived from 
subjects’ conversations with a confederate—who ostensibly had no involvement with the 
study—means that our internalization data cannot be explained by the possibility that 
subjects were simply conforming to experimental demand.  
Legal scholars are increasingly aware that digital trickeries could be used in forensic 
contexts to mislead people (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, 1998; Nelson, 1997). While our cheating event differs dramatically from the 
crimes that suspects are accused of, in particular because the act of taking money could 
have been considered unintentional, our findings are proof that many people will readily 
confess and develop erroneous beliefs if they are accused of an act and told about or 
confronted with false video evidence [see Horselenberg et al. (2006, Study 3), and Kassin 
& Kiechel (1996) for brief discussions of unintentional “crimes”]. Aside from the legal 
applications, our findings are also relevant to clinical settings. Kehle, Bray, Margiano, 
Theodore and Zhou (2002) demonstrated that doctored videos could be used to reduce the 
disruptive behavior of children with severe emotional disturbance. They showed some 
children videos of themselves with all episodes of disruptive behavior edited out—leaving 
only evidence of positive behaviour in the video. The children’s disruptive behaviour 
decreased significantly after viewing the edited videos. Kehle et al. hypothesized that their 
successful behavior modification technique is effective because the doctored media alters 
the children’s beliefs, and perhaps even their memories, about how they normally behave. 
Our results provide preliminary support for this hypothesis. 
On a theoretical level, our findings extend the metacognitive account of false belief 
development (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). When subjects were confronted with an 
accusation of cheating, they failed to remember improperly taking money. Thus they 
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turned to the available external information—the video—to help them decide whether or 
not they committed the act. We might hypothesize, then, that viewing the fake video made 
the false suggestion more powerful by one of three mechanisms: [1] increasing the 
perceived plausibility of the suggestion, [2] increasing the perceived credibility of the 
experimenter, or [3] enabling subjects to speculate about how or why they took money 
from the bank. One point to note is that we asked subjects to write down why they took 
the money, if they could conceive of a possible reason. There were comments such as “I 
must have been expecting to get the question right,” and these comments were more 
common in the see-video than told-video condition. Thus, it is feasible that watching the 
video enabled subjects to speculate about why the false event occurred. 
Models of false memory development propose that once subjects form false beliefs 
(Mazzoni et al., 2001) or relevant and plausible imagery (Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999), 
they are only one step away from producing false memories. The final step involves 
misattributing internally generated details to genuine experience (as per the source-
monitoring framework of Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, in press; see also Henkel & 
Coffman, 2004). Several recent studies have shown that repeated acts or extended periods 
of imagination can increase the likelihood of source-misattributions (e.g., Mazzoni & 
Memon, 2003; Read & Lindsay, 2000; Thomas & Loftus, 2002). For example, when 
people are asked to imagine a counterfactual experience, they are more likely to falsely 
remember that the event really happened if they imagined it three or five times rather than 
just once (Goff & Roediger, 1998). Due to ethical constraints we were unable to let our 
subjects consider the cheating event for an extended period, but the imagination research 
leads us to suspect that, given more time and the instruction to imagine, our see-video 
subjects might have been particularly vulnerable to memory distortions. 
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Our results show that the vast majority subjects who viewed the fake video confessed 
to the false act without resistance, and believed, at least partially, that they had genuinely 
taken money. Even the told-video subjects, who did not see the fake video evidence, 
indicated high rates of false beliefs. Although the fake video evidence might have 
produced these high confession rates, without a control condition in which subjects were 
accused without any evidence of taking the money we cannot say for sure whether the 
video evidence or the gambling-task per se produced the high false confession rates. 
Previous false evidence research (e.g., Kassin & Kiechel, 1996) indicates the false 
suggestion of evidence enhances internalization beyond an accusation alone. In line with 
this finding, many of our told-video subjects claimed they would not have believed the 
accusation had there been no mention of the video evidence. What we can say about our 
data is that subjects found the fake video evidence compelling, and this type of 
corroboration can cultivate internalized false confessions.  
Our doctored video paradigm offers a novel way to investigate the influence of false 
evidence upon false confessions and the formation of false beliefs. Future research should 
examine the combined impact of internal (metacognitive) and external (video) evidence on 
source-monitoring decisions. Might priming subjects’ knowledge about digital 
manipulations cause them to favour what they know over what they see?4 Moreover, there 
are several differences between our study and prior studies using false incriminating 
evidence, so we do not know whether false confessions and beliefs are more likely to 
emerge when the fake evidence is in the form of a video, photograph, trace evidence or 
eyewitness testimony. On a methodological note, our procedure for assessing 
internalization followed that of Kassin and Kiechel’s (1996) method which relies upon 
linguistic differences between subjects’ conversations with a confederate. Alternative 
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procedures for assessing internalization that rely upon more overt behaviors should be 
explored. 
Regardless of the mechanisms involved in creating our see-video versus told-video 
effect, the results show that doctored videos, or simply the proposition that video evidence 
exists, are potent forms of suggestion that can contribute to false confessions and foster 
false beliefs. According to these results, our advice to those who receive digital footage of 
themselves is: be warned, digital images from untrustworthy sources are like a box of 
chocolates; never know what you’re gonna get.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Text of confession 
 
Reason for refusal of payment/credit 
During the first session, participant took credit from the ‘bank’ [in Experiment 2 add 
“on three separate occasions”] when clearly instructed to return it. Due to nature of 
experiment, session data cannot be used for this reason. Data from subsequent session also 
invalid due to incorrect recording of results. Refusal requested to compensate time and 
money loss. 
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Footnote 
 
1 Our design restricts us to gathering one data point per subject on each conformity 
measure, thus to minimize procedural variation across subjects we used only two 
experimenters and one confederate in each experiment.  
2 In fact, all subjects in Experiment 1 signed the confession form. However, we used this 
procedure in Experiment 2 for subjects who did not confess. 
3 Four subjects in Experiment 2 indicated in their notes that they were suspicious about the 
experiment. Two of these had seen the video evidence; however neither suggested that the 
video might have been manipulated. None of these four subjects were included in the 
analyses, and four further subjects were tested. Our results are therefore based upon 30 
non-suspicious subjects. 
4 We thank Alan Scoboria for this suggestion. 
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Table 1.  
Experiment 1: Percentage of subjects classified into each compliance, internalization and 
confabulation category as a function of condition (Raw frequencies in parentheses; n=15 
in each condition). 
 
Condition Categorization Fisher’s exact p (two-sided) 
Compliance No compliance Complied on second request 
Complied on 
first request 
p = .10 
Told-Video 0% (0) 27% (4) 73% (11)  
See-Video 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (15)  
Internalization  No internalization 
Partial 
internalization 
Full 
internalization 
p = .03 
Told-Video 33% (5) 7% (1) 60% (9)  
See-Video 0% (0) 33% (5) 67% (10)  
Confabulation  No confabulation 
Hypothesizing Full 
confabulation 
p = 1.00 
Told-Video 93% (14) 7% (1) 0% (0)  
See-Video 87% (13) 7% (1) 7% (1)  
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Table 2.  
Experiment 2: Percentage of subjects classified into each compliance, internalization and 
confabulation category as a function of condition (Raw frequencies in parentheses; n=15 
in each condition). 
 
Condition Categorization Fisher’s exact p (two-sided) 
Compliance No compliance Complied on second request 
Complied on 
first request 
p = .73  
Told-Video 7% (1) 13% (2) 80% (12)  
See-Video 7% (1) 0% (0) 93% (14)  
Internalization  No internalization 
Partial 
internalization 
Full 
internalization 
p = .005 
Told-Video 40% (6) 47% (7) 13% (2)  
See-Video 13% (2) 13% (2) 73% (11)  
Confabulation  No confabulation 
Hypothesizing Full 
confabulation 
p = .04 
Told-Video 100% (15) 0% (0) 0% (0)  
See-Video 67% (10) 20% (3) 13% (2)  
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Table 3.  
Excerpts from conversations that subjects had with the confederate.  
 
Full internalization  Full confabulation 
Subject X (see-video 
group) 
 Subject Y (see-video 
group) 
 Subject Z (see-video 
group) 
Subject: I, I kind of took 
money from the bank 
when I got them wrong. 
Confederate: Okay… 
Subject: I don’t know 
why. But I’ve seen the 
video and it’s proof so 
it’s… 
Confederate: Oh dear! 
Subject: So yeah, I’ve got 
a bit of a problem. 
Confederate: I see. Do 
you remember that 
happening, or…? 
Subject: No, but I’ve 
looked at the video, and 
it’s kind of quite clear. 
Confederate: Mm… 
Subject: It’s scary seeing 
yourself on video making 
a complete idiot of 
yourself! 
 Subject: …it’s never 
happened before – trust 
me, it’s really bad! I’m 
just taking money, I 
know it’s only fake 
money, but I’m just 
taking money, when it’s 
not even mine! 
 
 Subject:  I wasn’t 
concentrating and 
obviously it’s close, you 
know, the bank and [your 
own money]. I got 
confused. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Screen shot of a question in the gambling task.  
Figure 2. The video doctoring process. 
 
